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[30 ELR 10261]

In the case of United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US-Shrimp),1 the
Appellate Body of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT's) World Trade Organization (WTO)2
declared that actions taken by the United States to protect endangered sea turtles were GATT-illegal. Despite
the official U.S. welcome extended to this decision,3 the conclusions of the Appellate Body challenge the
freedom of the United States to make significant foreign and domestic policy decisions. By ignoring and
effectively overruling decisions made by the U.S. judiciary, on the very same issues of U.S. constitutional and
administrative law that the Appellate Body chose to decide, the US-Shrimp case has made unprecedented
inroads into the sovereignty of the United States, and the protection of the environment. Not surprisingly, a
growing surge of criticism leveled at the outcome of this case contributed to the outrage vividly demonstrated
in Seattle in December 1999.

One result of the Seattle meeting is that the question of how the GATT/WTO may be reformed to incorporate
environmental, human rights, and other goals is back on the agenda.4 The twisted tale of the US-Shrimp case
demonstrates that the GATT/WTO is in urgent need of reform. Unfortunately, the Sysyphian task of reforming
the GATT/WTO is a long and arduous undertaking in which the odds are heavily stacked against the reformers.
While interstitial changes are tortuously negotiated in protracted sessions, the environment will continue to
suffer at the hands of the GATT/WTO. In order to prevent this, it makes eminent sense for trade and
environmental cases to be moved out of the GATT/WTO legal regime into more fair, open, and just tribunals.

Part I of this Article reviews the facts of the US-Shrimp case and addresses a bizarre twist in this tale. The USShrimp case is not a simple play with a single plot, in which a miscreant WTO thwarts the efforts of a virtuous
United States to protect internationally endangered sea turtles. On the contrary, there is more than a whiff of
suspicion that the United States equivocated over its decision to protect endangered sea turtles, and that it
did not play the ethical role that it portrayed. Startlingly, the Appellate Body relied on an admission made by
the United States in arriving at one of their reasons for holding against the United States on the crucial
grounds of "arbitrary discrimination." During oral hearings the United States made damaging and incorrect
admissions about the alleged absence of appeal and review procedures in the certification process of the U.S.
statute in controversy, along with other statements that were relied upon by the Appellate Body in arriving at
their finding of an absence of due process. Why the United States made these incorrect misstatements, and or

dubious admissions, and thereby jeopardized its case eludes an easy answer. One possible explanation,
although conjectural, is that the Clinton Administration abandoned sea turtles in order to further its broader
international economic agenda.

Such conduct would be consistent with the fact that the laws and policies of almost all national civil societies,
and particularly the United States, reflect some form of interest in group politics.5 Lawmakers commit their
countries to a variety of different and sometimes conflicting goals, objectives and programs that deal, for
example, with health, communications, welfare, transport, human rights, trade, and environmental
protection. The separate regimes establishing international free trade and environmental protection are wellestablished potential sources of conflict. The United States is party to many cases in GATT/WTO legal [30 ELR
10262] forums6 arguing for free trade, and may have found it necessary to sacrifice sea turtles in order to
further more important economic objectives.

Whether or not this is correct, what is clear, as Part II will demonstrate, is that GATT/WTO tribunals are illsuited to deal with questions of environmental protection. The embryonic legal system prevailing in
international society lacks compulsory judicial settlement, and there is little doubt that the GATT/WTO, which
possesses a system of compulsory and binding dispute settlement, endeavors to overcome this weakness by
bringing all trade-related disputes under its jurisprudential canopy. Their treaty mandate, however, shackles
them to GATT/WTO law, and excludes all other areas of law including international environmental law (IEL).
Not surprisingly, the decision in the US-Shrimp case is just the most recent in a string of decisions by the
GATT/WTO striking down efforts by the United States to protect the international environment.7

Part II will also contend that the US-Shrimp case ignored IEL, while encouraging the kind of false admissions
made by the United States. It reiterates the call for finding a more fair and just tribunal, such as those set up
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),8 possessed of jurisdiction to adjudicate
both international trade and environmental law.

Part I: Background and Analysis of US-Shrimp

A. Facts

The facts about sea turtles killed by shrimp trawling are well documented and generally uncontested. Shrimp
trawling is recognized as the most wasteful commercial fishery in the world.9 In the Gulf of Mexico alone,
shrimpers kill and waste approximately 2.5 billion pounds of fish a year, of which 70 percent would have been
commercially valuable upon further maturation.10 Among the by catch are sea turtles, the estimated yearly
loss worldwide being 100,000 turtles.11 These sea turtles represent a unique and vital part of the biodiversity
of the ocean and may even be categorized as indicator species.12 Their mortality presents a grave and present
danger to their existence.13

The reason for anxiety over the possible extinction of sea turtles arises from the fact that they are late
breeders. There is a high mortality rate of sea turtles before they reach breeding age due to natural
conditions.14 The study of the effects on protection of eggs and hatchlings have demonstrated that these
efforts alone do not lead to significant increases in population.15 Thus, the continued survival of juvenile, subadult, and adult sea turtles that have matured past the hatchling stage is important to the survival of the
various species.16 In order to protect these age groups of sea turtles from destructive shrimp trawling
practices, turtle excluder devices (TEDs)17 were developed and have proven to be the soundest and most
effective method available for protection.18

There are six species of turtles present in U.S. waters that are protected by the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).19 The Olive Ridley, Loggerhead, and Green turtles are classified as "threatened," and the Hawksbill,
Kemp Ridley, and Leatherback are listed as "endangered."20 The actions of the United States to protect sea
turtles are based on solid, generally uncontested, scientific data. In addition to numerous other studies,21 the
U.S. Congress in 1988 passed amending legislation to the ESA that directed the Secretary of Commerce to
contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for a definitive report on the plight and conservation of
sea turtles.22 In 1990, the NAS report on the Conservation of Sea Turtles found that shrimp trawling was
responsible for more sea turtle mortality than all other human activities combined and concluded that the use
of TEDs is vital to control the mortality of these endangered species.23 Furthermore, there was strong
evidence that these turtles were migratory global species that were not confined to the waters of the United
States and the outlying Caribbean areas. Pursuant to these studies, in § 609 of the 1989 U.S. Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill, the U.S. Congress added a legislative note to ESA § 8 entitled
"Conservation of Sea Turtles: Importation of Shrimp" (Section 609),24 which directed that the protection of
these endangered [30 ELR 10263] turtles be extended on a worldwide basis. Toward this objective Section 609
required that two major procedural or implementing steps be taken. First, it called upon the U.S. Secretary of
State to initiate bilateral and multilateral negotiations with foreign countries with a view to protecting sea
turtles.25 Second, it banned the importation of wild shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology and
established a certification procedure. No shrimp would be allowed into the United States unless the President
certified annually that the nation concerned employed a regulatory program comparable to the United States
and that the average rate of incidental takings of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting was
comparable to that of the United States, or that the harvesting techniques of a nation do not pose a threat of
incidental takings of sea turtles.26

The certification requirements were challenged by complainants India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand.27
They argued that the U.S. restrictions on the importation of shrimp violated Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1 of GATT
1994.28 In addition, the complainants argued that Section 609 did not qualify under the exceptions of Article
XX(b) or XX(g) of GATT 199429 and that Section 609 and its implementing measures "nullified or impaired
benefits" accruing to the complainants within the meaning of Article XXIII:1(a) of GATT 1994.30 Both the Panel
and the Appellate Body, though for different reasons, held that the attempt of the United States to protect
endangered sea turtles by restricting imports from countries that did not use TEDs was GATT-illegal. The
Appellate Body upheld the Panel's report finding the U.S. action to be inconsistent with Article XI of GATT
1994, but concluded specifically the action of the United States amounted to "unjustified discrimination" and
"arbitrary discrimination" under the chapeau (introductory or preambular provision) to Article XX of GATT
1994.31

B. Applicable Law

Before analyzing the decision of the Appellate Body it is necessary to sketch four fundamental aspects of the
law that have been misconstrued, or not discussed at all in the order of the Appellate Body. They relate to the
legal and constitutional status of the GATT/WTO as an international entity, the extent to which treaty
negotiations are an integral and critical component of state sovereignty, the need for international tribunals to
exercise judicial deference, and the decisions of U.S. courts on the very same issues addressed by the
Appellate Body.

1. The Limited Powers of the WTO

It is important to bear in mind that the WTO is an international and not a supranational organization. The term
"supranational" typically refers to an international organization that is empowered to exercise directly some
of the functions otherwise reserved to international States (States).32 A major distinguishing feature between
supranational and international organizations is the greater transfer of or limitation on the State sovereignty
involved in the establishment of a supranational organization.33 The European Union (EU) is a paradigmatic
example of a supranational organization.34

The treaties establishing the GATT/WTO are limited agreements between sovereign States that prevent or
control the parties from engaging in protectionist policies.35 The sovereignty or freedom of States otherwise
to behave freely is left untouched except to the extent that members may have bound themselves or
conferred specific powers upon the WTO to do so. The status of the WTO as an international, as distinct from
a supranational organization, is buttressed by the fact that the agreement creating the WTO, and the various
other covered agreements, do not set up a supranational or quasi-constitutional authority that is empowered
directly to exercise the powers that are reserved to States.36 Because it is an international, not a
supranational organization, there are no national measures that concede sovereignty to the WTO. Moreover,
unlike supranational organizations such as the EU, GATT/WTO tribunals clearly lack jurisdiction involving
private parties, and suits are limited to inter-state litigation. Furthermore, the decisions of GATT/WTO Panels
and the Appellate Body can remain unadopted by consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).37

GATT/WTO treaties are subject to the international law rules of ratification, and are to be interpreted "in
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international [30 ELR 10264] law."38 This
means that they are subject to "Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
parties."39 These rules of international law must include those created by other treaties, custom, and general
principles of law40 unless they are excluded by the agreements themselves.

2. Treaty Negotiations

Within the international legal system, the limited powers of an international organization such as the
GATT/WTO are juxtaposed with the more extensive powers of sovereign States, and "the type of international
cooperation undertaken by an organization and its constituent treaty will normally leave the reserved domain
of domestic jurisdiction untouched."41

The rules of international law make abundantly clear that the exercise of treaty making power is one of the
essential attributes of sovereignty and independence. Thus, a State's capacity of entering into relations with
other States, of its own free will, has been stressed by many jurists as the decisive criterion of statehood.42
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.)43 case concluded that
restrictions on the independence of States cannot be presumed.44 A corollary of the independence of States
is the duty of other States or international organizations to refrain from interfering with the treaty making
power of States.45 Any interference or intrusion into this "reserved domain" must be based on a specific and
definite conferral of power on the international organization.46 If there is no conferral of power to the
international organization, the State in exercising its treaty making power must be independent of legal orders
from other States or agencies.47

Moreover, this also means that a State is not answerable to another State or international organization on
how it should conduct its foreign policy. That is a matter within the reserve domain of a State unless there is
an explicit yielding of this power.48 Even where this has happened, the international organization must be
very sensitive about the manner in which it balances and draws the line of equilibrium between the sovereign
rights of a State and the limited competence of the organization.49

3. Judicial Deference

Even where international tribunals are possessed of jurisdiction to review or overrule such decisions, it is
important for international tribunals to recognize that the vertical command and control power structure
governing politics and law within nations is conspicuously absent within the international legal order. In
international society, power and authority rests on a horizontal base made up of sovereign [30 ELR 10265]
States.50 This horizontal nature of international law requires international tribunals to respect national
sovereignty and give substantial deference to findings of fact and interpretations of law by national courts.51
This principle is echoed in Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.52 In essence, it directs the panel to give deference to the facts and the
law as found by national tribunals. As to facts it states: "If the establishment of facts was proper and the
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned. . . ."53 In dealing with the law, it states:

(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with the customary
rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the

Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure
to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.54

By Ministerial Decision taken at the final Ministerial Conference of the Uruguay Round at Marrakesh,
Morocco, in April 1994, it was decided that this standard of review under Article 17(6) would be reviewed
after three years with a view to considering the question of whether it is capable of general application.55 This
has not happened but other provisions of the GATT treaty are even more relevant.

Illustrative of this relevance is Article X of GATT 1994. It provides for the setting up of special courts and
tribunals

for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs
matters. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative
enforcement and their decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies
unless an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time prescribed for
appeals to be lodged by importers . . . .56

Thus, if a special court has been set up for customs matters, Article X:3(b) of GATT 1994 appears to be stating
that in the absence of appeals therefrom, the decisions of that court are determinative of the issues and shall
govern the question at issue. If this interpretation is correct, the deference demanded is even greater than has
hitherto been contended.

Even Croley and Jackson, who argue that the GATT/WTO is more of a supranational organization than appears
to be the case, agree on the need for at least some deference to national bodies that are more representative
of the popular will than the unelected GATT/WTO. They call for a balance between sovereignty on the one
hand and the broader interest in realizing the gains of international coordination on the other.57 In the least,
this means that a "line of equilibrium," similar to that drawn by the Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case
between the rule of free trade and the exceptions under Article XX of GATT 1994,58 must be drawn between
the foundational rule of State sovereignty under public international law and the narrow exceptions created
by GATT.

4. Decisions of U.S. Courts

The protection of sea turtles has spawned a shoal of U.S. cases,59 of which two decisions are of particular
relevance. These two decisions have taken a totally different view on the pertinent issues raised before the
WTO and the conclusions on those issues adopted by the Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case. The first case
concerns the attempt of an environmental group to secure an injunction ordering the Secretary of State to
negotiate treaties.60 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that those parts of Section 609

directing the Secretary of State to initiate treaty negotiations violated the separation of powers under the U.S.
Constitution by infringing upon the President's exclusive power to negotiate with foreign governments and
could not be enforced.61

The same case also decided that the Court of International Trade (CIT) possessed exclusive jurisdiction with
regard to the certification procedures of Section 609.62 Notwithstanding such a finding, the Secretary of State
attempted to argue in the subsequent case of Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,63 that his actions
pertaining to certification were not subject to judicial review. The CIT's decision rejected this contention,
holding that the certification procedures could be reviewed both under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)64 and the citizen suit provisions of the ESA.

[30 ELR 10266]

C. The Conclusions of the Appellate Body

The Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case concluded that the "United States measure, while qualifying for
provisional justification under Article XX(g), fails to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX, and,
therefore, is not justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994."65 The exception in paragraph (g), referred to,
allows for restrictions that "relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. . . ."66 The chapeau
provides that:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures.67

The Appellate Body held that the actions of the United States amounted to both unjustifiable and arbitrary
discrimination.68

In arriving at their findings of "unjustifiable discrimination," one of the grounds upon which the Appellate
Body relied was Section 609(a), which directs the Secretary of State to negotiate treaties for the protection of
sea turtles. The Appellate Body determined that the United States had failed to engage "in serious, across-theboard negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and
conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against . . . shrimp. . . ."69 According to
the Appellate Body, apart from the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles, the United States did not make "any serious, substantial efforts to carry out these express directions
of Congress."70 Instead, the United States had acted in a discriminatory and unjustifiable manner by

negotiating seriously with some but not all GATT members (including the appellees) who exported shrimp to
the United States.71 The United States unsuccessfully argued that it had tried in good faith to enter into
bilateral and multilateral negotiations to protect sea turtles and had succeeded in doing so with 19 other
countries but not the complainants in this case. The United States additionally contended that it had
successfully negotiated the Inter-American Convention on the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles in
1996 and proposed to other Asian nations, including the complainants, that they should also enter into
multilateral negotiations, but were turned down by the complainants.72 Moreover, the United States had
transferred TED technology to over 30 developing countries, including many in Asia, prior to the imposition of
the ban.73

Although these contentions were argued before the Panel, it held that the negotiating efforts of the United
States merely consisted of an exchange of documents, and that the United States did not enter into
negotiations before it imposed certification requirements.74 The Appellate Body agreed with this finding of
the Panel and by holding the importation ban of Section 609 constituted "unjustifiable discrimination,"75
relied upon the inadequate negotiating efforts of the United States as a contributing factor.76

The Appellate Body also held that Section 609 was applied in a manner constituting "arbitrary discrimination"
under the chapeau to Article XX of GATT 1994 because the certification procedures under Section 609(b)(2)
were not "transparent" or "predictable."77 According to the Appellate Body the Section 609's procedures
consist principally of "administrative ex parte inquiry," with no formal opportunity for an applicant country to
be heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made against it.78 No formal written, reasoned,
decision is rendered. While a list of approved applications are published in the Federal Register, they are not
notified specifically. Countries whose applications are denied are omitted from the list but receive no formal
notification. Finally, "no procedure of, or appeal from, a denial of an application is provided."79 In the view of
the Appellate Body, there was no way for members to be certain that the terms of Section 609 and the
administrative guidelines were being applied "in a fair and just manner."80 They concluded that there was a
lack of due process in violation of Article X:3 of GATT 1994 that amounted to "arbitrary discrimination."81

D. The Flawed Character of the Appellate Body Decision

The considerations criticized in this Article were not the only ones offered by the Appellate Body for arriving at
their [30 ELR 10267] decision that the U.S. actions amounted to unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.82
Consequently, a preliminary question that requires examination is the extent to which demonstrably, albeit
partially, flawed reasoning taints the entirety of an international judicial order.

The authority and persuasiveness of any international order depends on the extent to which it can offer good
and convincing reasons for the conclusions it reaches. The persuasive power of an opinion "must depend very
largely on the force of the reasoning by which it is supported."83 The reasoning adopted by an opinion
supports and justifies its order, and the quality of this reasoning is an important factor that facilitates the
acceptance, and enhances the authority, of international judicial decisions.84

If the Appellate Body chooses to rely on more than one reason for its conclusion, then each one of these
reasons becomes an integral part of the material law and facts providing the doctrinal justification of that
order. None of the reasons can be severed or cherry picked from the judgment. Where, therefore, the
Appellate Body gives a number of reasons for its decision, all of them form part of the interlinked chain of
reasoning that cannot be dismembered. Thus, it is not possible to sever or separate the bad reasons from the
good, and rely only on the good while discarding the bad.

The judicial system of the WTO is not governed by stare decisis or the doctrine of binding precedent.
Nonetheless, as judicial bodies, WTO tribunals first determine the material facts85 and create doctrines86 that
provide the reasoned justification for the case being decided. The doctrines, rules, or conclusions arrived at in
deciding a case may serve as persuasive, albeit nonbinding, precedents in subsequent cases. In the US-Shrimp
case the Appellate Body chose to rely, at least partially, on demonstrably erroneous and flawed reasons for
concluding that the application of Section 609 amounted to both "unjustifiable" and "arbitrary" discrimination.
The infirmity of these reasons renders their conclusions on both standards unsupportable.

1. Unjustifiable Discrimination

There are at least three obvious problems with the Appellate Body's decision that the absence of diligent
treaty negotiation by the United States amounted to "unjustifiable discrimination." First, it constitutes a
violation of the principle of state sovereignty by attempting to second-guess the manner in which the United
States should have conducted treaty negotiations. As we have seen, States possess the freedom to negotiate
treaties as they deem proper. This is an essential attribute of sovereignty that gives rise to the corollary duty
of other States or international organizations not to interfere with this power. This is precisely what the
Appellate Body did. It entered into the reserved domain of the United States and passed judgment on the
manner in which the United States had exercised this right.

Second, Section 609, which must be read a part of the ESA, does require the Secretary of State to negotiate
bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, we have noted that the Ninth Circuit has ruled that this
requirement violated the separation of powers within the constitution and that such directions are illegal and
unenforceable. The Appellate Body's conclusion that the Secretary of State did not make "any serious and
substantial efforts to carry out these express directions of Congress" ignores the unconstitutionality of that
provision, and effectively overrules a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals.87 There is nothing in the
GATT/WTO or its covered agreements conferring such powers on it.

Third, even if the GATT/WTO did possess the power to interfere with the sovereign decisions of States, their
finding of "unjustifiable discrimination" also ignored the need to give substantial deference to the fact that the
United States had tried to negotiate treaties and had in fact succeeded in doing so with 14 other nations.
Croley and Jackson, although arguing that the GATT/WTO is something of a supranational organization, call for

a balance between sovereignty on the one hand and the broader interest in realizing the gains of international
coordination on the other.88

In the US-Shrimp case the Appellate Body labored strenuously to draw a "line of equilibrium" between the rule
of free trade and nondiscrimination created by the GATT on the one hand, and the exceptions under Article XX
on the other.89 The Appellate Body reasoned that their interpretation of the chapeau was an exercise in such
equilibrium line drawing. Having held that the actions of the United States fell within the exceptions to Article
XX, they struck down the U.S. certification program on the basis that the U.S. action amounted to
"unjustifiable discrimination." On a parity of reasoning, they also should have balanced the sover-eignty of a
State, with special reference to the reserved domain of treaty making and deference on the one hand, with
the limited powers conferred upon the GATT/WTO on the other. Their decision to draw just one line of
equilibrium, without any mention or even awareness of their need to draw another, amounts to undisguised
trespass into the reserved domain of States.

2. Arbitrary Discrimination

The Appellate Body's decision that the certification program lacked procedures for review and appeal flies in
the face of the express decision of the CIT. A similar argument was raised in the CIT, and its June 1995 decision
held that the certification decision could be reviewed both under the APA as well as the ESA.90 As we have
seen, the CIT is a special court set up for customs matters and Article X:3(b) of [30 ELR 10268] GATT 1994
appears to be stating that in the absence of appeals therefrom, the decisions of the CIT are determinative of
the issues and shall govern the question at issue. If this interpretation is correct, the deference demanded is
even greater than has hitherto been contended. Since the CIT possesses exclusive jurisdiction over the
certification issues of Section 609,91 and it has ruled that certification procedures are reviewable under both
the APA and ESA, absent an appeal from such a decision, Article X:3(b) obligates GATT tribunals to be bound
by such a ruling.

If anything, it is arbitrary and capricious for an international tribunal such as the Appellate Body, plainly
untutored in American administrative law, to make the startling claim that the U.S. administrative process is
lacking in elementary rules of administrative justice and that there is no review under U.S. law of a substantive
administrative decision involving an entitlement such as the certification created by Section 609. The various
Department of State guidelines implementing the certification program of Section 609 did state that the
procedures were not subject to the notice comment and delayed effectiveness provisions of the APA,92 but
this did not in any way affect the ability of an aggrieved party, such as one of the complainants, from
challenging the final order under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, on grounds, inter alia, that it was conducted without
observance of procedure required by law.93 The APA has also specifically waived sovereign immunity for this
kind of action.94

This question of entitlement to judicial review of Section 609's certification procedure is resolved implicitly in
the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which did not recognize any obstacle to the CIT's jurisdiction over issues

arising under Section 609(b)'s importation ban for nations that fail to meet the certification requirements.95
The question is also easily answered by a glance at provisions of the APA. The APA, in 5 U.S.C. § 701, permits
actions of "each authority of the Government of the United States" to be subject to judicial review unless
there is a statutory prohibition on review or the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."96
In this case, there is no indication that judicial review of Section 609 is foreclosed because of statutory
language. Nor is there any "showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a . . . legislative intent"97 to
foreclose access to judicial review.98 Furthermore, Section 609(b) procedures do not fall within the exception
for action "committed to agency discretion." This exception has been construed narrowly and the legislative
history of the APA shows that it is applicable only in cases where statutes have been drawn so broadly that
there is no law to apply.99

In light of the availability of judicial review of Section 609(b), it should be noted that Article X of GATT 1994,
dealing with the publication and administration of trade regulations, stipulates the most minimal procedural
safeguards. It requires only that the applicable laws and regulations be published,100 that "each contracting
party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and
rulings,"101 and that contracting parties "shall maintain, or institute . . . judicial, arbitral or administrative
tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative
action relating to customs matters."102 The APA thus more than satisfies these requirements.

3. The Sting in the Tale

At this stage we need to be appraised of the strange behavior of the United States. The Secretary of State, to
whom the President delegated his power under Section 609, was not a willing party to a worldwide ban on the
importation of turtle destroying shrimp. The Secretary initially limited its jurisdiction to countries in the wider
Caribbean and western Atlantic regions. This decision was challenged by environmental groups and on
December 29, 1995, the CIT ruled that Section 609 applied to all the oceans of the world, not merely the wider
Caribbean, and that annual certification must apply to a nation as a whole, and not on a ship-by-ship basis.103

The equivocation of the United States is starkly framed by the manner in which the Secretary attempted to
circumvent this court order. The Administration first requested and was denied an extension of one year.104
Undaunted, it then published revised guidelines105 (1996 Guidelines) permitting a declaration by the
importer to take the place of the certification required by Section 609 of the Conservation of Sea Turtles
Act.106 Such declarations by countries engaged in industrial fishing would have permitted imports on a [30
ELR 10269] ship-by-ship basis, and eviscerated the objectives of Congress. Not surprisingly, these regulations
were successfully challenged, for the second time, on the basis that they were not in conformity with the
court's judgment.107

There is little doubt that these errant regulations would have defeated the objectives of Section 609 for a
number of reasons. First, by requiring TEDs only on those vessels that harvest shrimp for export to the United
States, the 1996 Guidelines placed sea turtles at a greater risk of incidental capture by non-TED equipped

boats. Second, it reduced incentives for countries to adopt comprehensive national programs, in which they
equipped all their shrimp trawlers with TEDs, by opting instead for ship-by-ship and shipment-by-shipment
authorization. Finally, it would be extremely difficult to verify whether or not imported shrimp alleged to be
TED caught were in fact harvested in that manner.

Despite these reasons, the Secretary appealed the order of the CIT, and the Federal Circuit vacated on a
technicality that had nothing to do with the merits or substance of the case.108 The Administration then
seized this technical victory to issue revised guidelines in August 1998109 (1998 Guidelines) which reinstated
the 1996 Guidelines. On challenge has now held that these 1998 Guidelines also conformity with the language
of Section 609.110

At the same time that the misconceived 1998 Guidelines were issued, and were being supported by the U.S.
government before Judge Aquilino of the CIT, the Administration was also defending its worldwide ban before
the WTO panels. Facing both ways like Janus, they appeared in the words of Judge Aquilino to take "another
attack"111 before the WTO. The Administration's brief and arguments before the Appellate Body gave the
impression that it was serious about the protection of sea turtles112 This appearance, however, did not last
long. What happend at the hearings before the Appellate Body provides a surprising, even bizarre, twist and
sting to this tale.112

In arriving at their conclusion that the conduct of the United States amounted to "arbitrary discrimination" the
Appellate Body relied upon the following facts:

With respect to neither type of certification under Section 609(b)(2) there is a transparent, predictable
certification process that is followed by the competent United States government officials. The certification
processes under section 609 consist principally of administrative ex parte inquiry or verification by staff of the
Office of Marine Conservation in the Department of State with staff of the United States National Marine
Fisheries Service. With respect to both types of certification, there is no formal opportunity for an applicant to
be heard, or to respond to any arguments that may be made against it, in the course of the certification
process before a decision to grant or deny certification is made. Moreover, no formal written, reasoned
decision whether of acceptance or rejection, is rendered on applications for either type of certification,
whether under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) or under Section 609(b)(2)(C) . . . . No procedure for review of, or
appeal from, a denial of an application is provided.113

These conclusions of the Appellate Body referenced statements by the United States at the oral hearing.114 In
particular, the Appellate Body's statement that "no procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an
application is provided," relied on such a U.S. admission as its basis in fact.115 From this and other facts
admitted by the United States, the Appellate Body arrived at the legal conclusion that "effectively, exporting
Members applying for certification whose applications are rejected are denied basic fairness and due process,
and are discriminated against, vis-a-vis those members which are granted certification."116 It then discussed
Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 and went on to state:

The non-transparent and ex parte nature of the internal governmental procedures applied by the
competent officials in the Office of Marine Conservation, the Department of State, and the United States
National Marine Fisheries Service throughout the certification processes under section 609, as well as the fact
that countries whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons
for the denial, and the fact that there is no formal legal procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an
application, are all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994.117

Thus, the U.S. admission at the oral hearing that there is no formal legal procedure for appeal or review played
a critical part in the Appellate Body's decision that the actions of the United States amounted to "arbitrary
discrimination." As previously discussed, this admission flies in the face of a U.S. federal court decision on the
same issue.118 It also runs [30 ELR 10270] counter to the principles and rules of due process found both in the
APA as well as the U.S. Constitution.

If the United States did not mean to make such a damaging and errant admission it should have sought to
correct the record. The United States did not such thing. On the contrary it welcomed119 and then scurried to
comply with the order of the Appellate Body without any protest by issuing new regulations.120 The revised
Department of State regulations concerning Section 609 seek to bring the United States into compliance with
GATT law, but it will not be known until it is challenged again if a subsequent GATT Panel or Appellate Body
Report will find these revised regulations GATT-legal.

In the least, the admissions by the United States, along with the alacrity with which it welcomed the decision
of the Appellate Body, cries out for public clarification. While such an explanation may or may not be
forthcoming, it is evident that the US-Shrimp case serves the purpose of drawing attention to the failings of
the GATT/WTO legal regime to deal fairly with questions involving IEL. It is imperative to move such disputes
into a more satisfactory forum that can avoid the kind of suspicions surrounding the US-Shrimp case.

Part II: Deciding International Trade and Environment Disputes

A. A Fairer Judicial Forum Than GATT/WTO

There is little doubt that the absence of compulsory judicial settlement is a serious weakness in the embryonic
legal system prevailing in international society. The GATT/WTO, which possesses a unique system of
compulsory and binding dispute settlement, endeavors to overcome this weakness by bringing all traderelated disputes under its jurisprudential canopy. This system of compulsory dispute settlement could be seen
as the jewel in the crown of free trade under which the world has enjoyed nearly half a century of unrivaled
economic growth, prosperity, and comity following World War II.

In contrast, IEL institutions121 are fragmented and lack the WTO's global authority, organizational structure,
financial backing, and legal status. Many IEL legal forums, with the exception of UNCLOS, lack the international
jurisdiction, authority, and implementing powers of the WTO.122 Because of their institutional and legal
prominence, first GATT panels, and now the stronger DSB under the WTO, have emerged as the sole legal
forum for resolving many disputes where the goals of environmental protection and free trade conflict.

Environmentalists have reason to fear this assertion of jurisdiction by the GATT/WTO for a number of
reasons.123 First, the substantive or constitutional law of the GATT/WTO ignores international law dealing
with environmental protection, and treats any law or treaty not embodied in GATT or its "Covered
Agreements," as irrelevant. The GATT/WTO is precluded from taking cognizance of international
environmental laws, even though these laws constitute an important segment of international law. By
contrast, UNCLOS Tribunals "shall apply . . . other rules of international law not incompatible with this
Convention."124 This formulation is more receptive to international law, and less restrictive of non-UNCLOS
law than the comparable provisions of the GATT/WTO that assiduously and systematically exclude all but
GATT law.

The law applied by the GATT/WTO is confined to that found in its own treaties and does not recognize any
broader corpus of general international law, let alone IEL.125 Since environmental protection never was and is
not a GATT/WTO objective, the GATT and its covered agreements do not deal with environmental protection
apart from the exceptions found in Article XX of GATT 1994, and an exception in the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.126 It is abundantly clear that GATT/WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies must restrict
themselves to Articles 16 and 17(14) of Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement—entitled Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)—and the Covered Agreements,127 [30 ELR 10271]
which, moreover, should be interpreted and construed strictly in a way that does not add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided by the treaties.128

UNCLOS, in contrast to the GATT, tries in various provisions to accommodate international law. The general
provision dealing with its relation to other conventions,129 the non-derogation clause notwithstanding, tries
to reconcile, and not repudiate, the rights and obligations arising from other agreements. Consequently,
UNCLOS tribunals can take cognizance of GATT law, while their GATT counter-parts are unable to take
cognizance of UNCLOS.

Despite a rhetorical reference to environmental protection in the hortatory preamble of the WTO,130
GATT/WTO treaties call for the advance of free trade effectively unrestrained by environmental constraints.
Such an advancement of free trade, impervious to environmental concerns, apparently relied upon the
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), which posited that economic growth is a pre-condition to environmental
protection. Such a view was adopted by an earlier report of the GATT Secretariat.131 The present Secretariat
appears to have moved away from such a doctrinaire position, and suggested that the EKC may not follow an
immutable path. They have conceded that competitive pressure may prevent the turn around of the pollution
path, and that economic growth driven by trade liberalization may defeat the mechanisms that could generate
an EKC.132 They also admit that economic growth is not sufficient for turning environmental damage around

and that appropriate environmental and regulatory policies are necessary.133 Such a position appears to
support the use of policies that promote environmental protection by way of trade measures. But turning its
own logic on its head, the report asserts that the use of trade measures is fraught with risk for the multilateral
trading system.134 The underlying premise of this conclusion is that trade sanctions must remain the
monopoly of the GATT/WTO.135 While consistent with GATT/WTO treaties, which fail to recognize any other
laws, such a position ignores the reality of an international legal system encompassing a much wider corpus of
law including, inter alia, those protecting the environment and human rights.

Second, the track record of GATT/WTO litigation demonstrates the extent to which international
environmental protection has been diminished. GATT/WTO judicial bodies view IEL trade restrictions as
obstructions to the painfully engineered legal regime created by the GATT/WTO aimed at liberalizing trade by
eliminating controls and restrictions. In an apparently candid admission, the GATT Secretariat once conceded
that it is reasonable for concerned countries to seek to change the actions and policies of others that damage
the global environment,136 but the present Secretariat has recanted from this position, and the cases have
been inconsistent in disallowing the use of trade restrictions that promote environmental protection.

The primary avenue of overcoming GATT prohibitions against trade restrictions137 is by finding justification
under Article XX of GATT 1994 and its chapeau. The chapeau provides that:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which could constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures. . . .138

The most important exceptions, found in paragraphs (b) & (g), allow restrictive measures that: "(b) [are]
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . ," or "(g) relate to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption . . . ."139

There is an extensive jurisprudence dealing with the nature and ambit of these exceptions140 which cannot
be explored fully in this Article. Instead, this Article takes a functional look at the application of these
exceptions in three previous cases that together offer a baseline for interpreting Article XX exceptions of GATT
1994. They are United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (US-Tuna I),141 United States-Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna (US-Tuna [30 ELR 10272] II),142 and United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline (US-Gasoline).143 The very narrow grounds on which these decisions justify
environmental action do not provide a satisfactory basis for ensuring environmental protection.

The GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report in US-Tuna I involved a case in which the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA)144 of the United States required the relevant authorities to ban the importation of

yellow tuna that had been caught with nets that resulted in the killing of dolphins. After years of fruitless
negotiation between the United States and Mexico to establish rules for dolphin mortality, the United States
placed a total embargo on the importation of yellow tuna caught with dolphin-killing rather than dolphinfriendly nets.145 The GATT Panel held that the U.S. ban violated the GATT and did not fall within the
exceptions in Article XX (b), (d), or (g).

Three years later, in US-Tuna II, the European Economic Community challenged the secondary embargo
provisions of the MMPA that required any intermediary nation exporting yellow tuna to the United States to
provide the relevant authorities with proof that such yellow tuna had not been caught with dolphin-killing
nets.146 Once again the GATT Panel held against the United States. According to the Panel, such action was
not "necessary" under Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, and was not "primarily aimed at" the conservation of
natural resources under Article XX(g) of GATT 1994.147

The report of the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline was an appeal from a WTO Dispute Panel that Venezuela and
Brazil successfully called upon to review pollution standards for gasoline imposed by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act (CAA).148 The dispute revolved around whether domestic
refiners were given an unfair and preferential advantage over foreign refiners in the formulation and setting of
the standards.149 The Appellate Body ruled that the manner in which the United States determined the 1990
baselines, and the consequent pollution standards for gasoline under the CAA, could not be justified under
Article XX (b), (d), and (g) of GATT 1947.150

In two of these three cases, the United States took action to protect the environment and did not argue that it
was obliged to do so by treaty. In light of the apparently unilateral nature of the U.S. actions, a preliminary
question is whether the GATT/WTO permits environmental action that has been authorized and mandated,
though not obligated, by a multilateral treaty that did not include all GATT contractual parties.151

This question was in fact addressed in US-Tuna II.152 The United States, while not claiming that its actions
were obligated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES),153 did in fact offer treaty justification for its actions. It argued generally that its actions "were
consistent with and directly furthered the objectives"154 of CITES and other environmental treaties, and more
specifically, that they were authorized and empowered by CITES. According to the United States:

All species of dolphins involved in the fishery of the eastern tropical Pacific were listed in CITES Appendix II.
Moreover, while the United States was not obliged under CITES to adopt the measures at issue, CITES
specifically provided for these measures in providing for "stricter domestic measures" in order to further the
objectives of that agreement. The Unites States' measures were stricter domestic measures, as explicitly
contemplated under CITES, taken to protect species of dolphins that CITES protects. These measures were in
addition to the restrictions on trade in specimens of the dolphins themselves that are required under CITES . . .
.155

Relying on CITES and other international environmental treaties, the United States contended that these
treaties should, according to international law, be taken into account as general or special rules for
interpreting Article XX of the GATT.156 Further, the United States argued that the actions taken by the parties
to these multilateral environmental treaties constituted "subsequent practice" under general international
law and Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. The Panel made short shrift of these arguments, asserting
that the CITES and the other environmental treaties were not subsequent agreements signed by all the parties
to the GATT. With regard to the use of IEL agreements in the interpretation [30 ELR 10273] or application of
Article XX, the Panel bluntly declared that "they did not apply to the interpretation of the General Agreement
or the application of its provisions."157

The Panel, by so holding, was acting in conformity with GATT law and jurisprudence. The recognition that
environmental treaties affect the interpretation or application of the GATT would require judicial law making
that GATT/WTO panels are forbidden from undertaking.158 It would, in any case, be a mistake to argue that
unilateral decisions are more difficult to justify than those based on multilateral treaties159 because there is
no distinction made in the language of Article XX of GATT 1947 between treaty and nontreaty justification.

There are other ways in which the GATT and the decisions of GATT/WTO tribunals can obstruct the
implementation of environmental treaties. First, the word "necessary" (to protect human, animal, or plant life
and health) in Article XX(b) of GATT 1994 has been restrictively interpreted160 to mean that a government
must employ the measure that is the least GATT-inconsistent. Even where a measure is required to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health, it may well be held to be "unnecessary" in the view of the GATT/WTO
tribunal, if such tribunal determines that other measures, more consistent with GATT, were available. Import
and export restrictions under CITES could well be struck down on the basis that they are not the least trade
restricting measures available to the country concerned.

Second, US-Tuna II interpreted "relating to" (the conservation of exhaustible natural resources) in Article XX(g)
of GATT 1947 to allow extra-territorial conservation efforts that had been prohibited by US-Tuna I.161
However, the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline reconfirmed the rule asserted in US-Tuna II that such policies
should be primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,162 as determined by the
GATT/WTO. This means that GATT/WTO tribunals can impugn any action taken under any IEL convention on
the basis that the action is, in their view, not primarily aimed at conservation even if the concerned States
assert a contrary view.

Third, GATT/WTO tribunals have assumed a disturbing interventionist character. Oblivious of their appellate
status, they seem eager to override the judgment of sovereign nations with which they disagree, and make
their own decisions on the facts. They seem unaware of judicial restraint, the need for deference to the
decisions of national fact-finding bodies, or standards of review that restrain an Appellate Body from
interfering in an executive action unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.163 This is most
clearly born out by the manner in which the Appellate Body sought to interfere with U.S. treaty making, and
overrule decisions of the U.S. courts in the US-Shrimp case.

Fourth, US-Tuna I reiterated the rule that Article XX of GATT 1947 could only be directed at products, not at
process or production methods.164 It concluded that measures aimed at reducing dolphin killing were a
production method and thus were not covered by Article XX(g) of GATT 1947.

Finally, the Appellate Body in US-Gasoline created another formidable hurdle against GATT member States
seeking to claim the environmental exemptions under Article XX of GATT 1994. It found that the burden
placed on States that sought to come within Article XX was not confined to satisfying the narrow health,
environment, and natural resource exemptions found within paragraphs (a) to (j). After doing so, they had to
further prove that the measures taken did not violate the "chapeau" of Article XX that prohibit "arbitrary" or
"unjustified" discrimination, or a "disguised restriction" of free trade. In holding that the United States had
violated the chapeau,165 the Appellate Body demonstrated no hesitation in second-guessing the judgment
and overruling decisions and rules made by the EPA, the executive or administrative agency that makes
decisions affecting national environmental policy. In doing so, it showed scant regard for the ordinary and
well-recognized principles of deference accorded to the primary decisionmaker. We have seen how the
sovereignty of the United States was assailed in even more stark fashion by the Appellate Body in the USShrimp case.

Furthermore, the panelists who interpret such substantive trade law are unfamiliar with, if not unfriendly
toward, laws and agreements directed at international environmental protection. To begin, the DSU defines
who may serve as a panel member:

[30 ELR 10274]

Persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a
contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement
or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.166

It is striking that this list does not include anyone with qualifications outside the field of trade law, and
automatically excludes anyone with expertise in international environmental law who does not also have the
Article 8 qualifications.

GATT/WTO panelists are prevented from engaging in the customary judicial role of interpreting and
developing the law. This is because of the constraints imposed on panelists by Article 3(2) of the DSU. Article
3(2) is an interesting provision that has all the hallmarks of an unresolved disagreement. It reiterates that the
dispute settlement system should first, preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the Covered
Agreements and second, clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law.167 Having stated this, it proceeds immediately to attenuate
future interpretation by prohibiting any tribunal from adding to or diminishing rights and obligations provided

in the Covered Agreements.168 This flies in the face of judicial law making and assumes a set of precise, tailor
made, predetermined and inflexible rights and duties that can be mechanically dispensed without any judicial
intervention.169

Such an approach is untenable for a number of reasons. First, the DSU and the Covered Agreements were
made by humans not gods, and cannot anticipate the multiplicity of contingencies and circumstance that
could give rise to controversies about rights and duties. Second, the DSU and the Covered Agreements cannot
anticipate the law that should be applied in every situation. Each set of rights and duties ought to be applied
to the particular variegated fact situation; the scope of each right and duty could not possibly be ordained in
advance. That is why international instruments are couched in various degrees of generality and
indeterminacy.170 Third, duties and rights are correlative concepts,171 but they are "institutions" and tools of
judicial reasoning for deriving and assigning benefits and burdens. It has persuasively been argued that
institutional concepts consist of three sets of rules: (1) a set of constitutive rules specifying situations to which
they might be applied, (2) a set of rules specifying the legal consequences, and (3) terminative rules specifying
outcomes.172 Each step involves judicial analysis, reasoning, discretion, and power within a continuing time
frame to ascertain the nature, scope, and applicability of indeterminate rights and duties.

The DSU attenuates judicial discretion, or freedom, to adapt the law to new situations. It defies reality by
assuming that an initial expression of law in a treaty freezes both time and content. In fact, any expression of
law is intended to be applied to future events over an indefinite period of time during which its initial meaning
is subject to change.

The customary international rules of interpretation, restated in the Vienna Convention,173 assume there can
be no omniscient expression of rights and obligations that can be applied automatically with dogmatic
immutability. Instead, the Vienna Convention calls for any treaty to be interpreted according to its ordinary
meaning in "context and in the light of its object and purpose."174 In addition to context, the Vienna
Convention states that any applicable rules of international law should be taken into account.175

The DSU has apparently rejected the Vienna Convention criteria by asserting that the rights and obligations set
out in the Covered Agreements are sufficient for all purposes, and earlier references to rules of interpretation
in the DSU must be understood as aspirational and cosmetic rather than obligatory. GATT/WTO's judicial
system appears even more inward looking and blinkered when compared to International Court of Justice (ICJ)
jurisprudence. ICJ decisions apply treaties, international custom, the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the publicists.176 The law applied by the GATT/WTO
is confined to its own agreements.

B. Jurisdiction of UNCLOS in Trade and Environment Disputes

In light of all the shortcomings of GATT/WTO tribunals as a forum for trade and environment disputes, it is
useful at this point to emphasize the importance and viability of UNCLOS as another international forum for
such cases. The argument for resorting to UNCLOS tribunals has more fully been addressed177 and those
conclusions will only briefly be asserted here. Importantly, within key areas of potential conflict, the
substantive international environmental obligations and the dispute settlement procedures of UNCLOS
countervail GATT/WTO. UNCLOS not only incorporates substantive principles of IEL, it also creates a binding
system of adjudication and dispute resolution that confers upon its legal forums the jurisdiction and
adjudicatory authority to hear trade and environment [30 ELR 10275] disputes. Additionally, even where
States are not parties to UNCLOS, but nevertheless accept its provisions as codifications of customary IEL, the
ICJ is in a position to adjudicate trade and environment disputes in limited circumstances.

The countervailing jurisdiction of UNCLOS in trade environment disputes could raise some concerns and even
give rise to the specter of judicial uncertainty resulting from competing jurisdiction between two lawfully
constituted international tribunals. First, might there be a race to the most favorable courthouse? Second,
what of the confusion and uncertainty resulting from two tribunals exercising jurisdiction over the same case?
Third, might the absence of established rules of international law governing clashes between tribunals
asserting concurrent jurisdiction lead to a form of judicial anarchy in which UNCLOS and WTO tribunals joust
with each other for judicial supremacy? Finally, how might conflicting orders of these tribunals be
implemented or enforced?

The question of competing jurisdiction amongst tribunals established by treaties (intergovernmental tribunals)
has not hitherto been addressed by treaty or customary law.178 In the absence of treaty or customary norms
governing how international tribunals should act, two other sources of public international law, "general
principles of law," and "judicial decisions . . . of the various nations,"179 must be examined. There is no doubt
that "general principles of law" enjoy parity of legal status, albeit not of importance, with treaties and custom,
as primary sources of international law. The Statute of the ICJ underscored the primary status of "general
principles" by characterizing the other sources of international law: "judicial decisions," and the "teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists" as "subsidiary" means for determining the rules of law.180

The general principles of law referred to can be adopted or derived from conflict of laws (Conflicts)
jurisprudence dealing with jurisdiction among the domestic (national) courts of various countries. There are
two primary principles that can be determined from Conflicts theory dealing with issues of conflicting
jurisdiction: reasonableness and fairness.181 These foundational principles are also articulated through other
more specific supplemental principles such as forum non conveniens, comity, and choice of law.

Conflicts analysis also divides a court's jurisdiction into two inquiries: legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction,182
and judicial jurisdiction.183 If we adopt this structural analysis, the primary and supplemental general
principles of law deriving therefrom may be applied to the potential jurisdictional clash between the
GATT/WTO and UNCLOS. The conclusion is that the application of these general principles of law and the
judicial decisions of the various countries justifies the assertion of both legislative and judicial jurisdiction by
UNCLOS tribunals.

The Conflicts experience in analogous cases also demonstrates that many of the fears articulated by a
potential clash between the GATT/WTO and UNCLOS are unfounded, and that conflicting jurisdiction does not
give rise to judicial anarchy. Domestic courts in different countries have arrived at a functional and legal
understanding and accommodation of each other's concurrent jurisdiction, and have attempted to resolve
conflicts on the basis of legal principle rather than arbitrary caprice.184

The answers to questions relating to the legislative and judicial jurisprudence of the GATT/WTO and UNCLOS
all assume a further foundational premise: that both forums are engaged in the common pursuit of justice
rather than of judicial hegemony. If this premise is correct, the existence of UNCLOS as an alternate forum to
challenge the hitherto untouched monopoly of the GATT/WTO in trade and environment disputes might
generate genuine reform within the latter body. Reform would both advance international comity by
minimizing or eliminating potential conflict and promote the enlightened self-interest of the GATT/WTO.

Conclusion

The US-Shrimp case is only the latest in a line of decisions made by GATT/WTO tribunals that have made
significant inroads into the reserve domain of the United States. The case demonstrates, moreover, how an
unsympathetic tribunal that does not recognize IEL can thwart environmental protection. The dominance of
trade law to the exclusion of environmental law can pressurize States into surrendering or subjugating
environmental objectives in order to advance their trade and economic interests. Countries such as the United
States could become persuaded that the best way to promote important economic issues such as the export
of beef into Europe or the removal of trade barriers in Japan, is by jettisoning the protection of the
environment. This might explain the admissions by the United States in the US-Shrimp case.

Such a dilemma could be avoided by confining GATT/WTO adjudication to trade disputes alone, while referring
trade and environmental cases to a tribunal under UNCLOS that applies both international trade and
environmental law. The prosecution of environmental objectives in UNCLOS should be handled by
environmental not trade agencies. Doing so would prevent trade representatives, who are not usually
committed to environmental protection, from readily conceding environmental objectives in exchange for
other favors, as they might have done in the US-Shrimp case in the GATT/WTO.

While the need for impartial legal forums that can decide trade and environment disputes is met by UNCLOS
tribunals, one major barrier confronts the United States. It has not ratified UNCLOS and is thereby prevented
from accessing [30 ELR 10276] UNCLOS tribunals. In the circumstances, it has become increasingly evident that
the problems encountered in the GATT/WTO provide another powerful reason as to why the United States
should ratify UNCLOS. Those who have objected to UNCLOS because of the alleged loss of sovereignty must
now recognize that the boot is on the other foot. The GATT/WTO has encroached on the sovereignty of the
United States, and UNCLOS gives the United States an opportunity to regain its sovereignty, and recoup some
of the ground lost to the GATT/WTO.

From a political standpoint, it is conceivable that the presence of another forum challenging its judicial
monopoly might produce genuine reforms within the GATT/WTO and lead to the recognition and
accommodation of IEL. The reformation of the GATT/WTO to include IEL would, of course, obviate the need
for taking trade environment disputes to another tribunal. It is, however, difficult to believe that the
GATT/WTO will reform itself in the absence of competing UNCLOS jurisdiction. Political reality requires that
the GATT/WTO be countervailed by UNCLOS.
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